Senior manager participation is a key success driver for process improvement programs. To increase their participation, we designed an intervention in which senior managers worked with frontline staff to identify and solve safety-related problems over an 18-month period. On average, the 20 randomly selected treatment hospitals identified 17.3 problems per work area and solved 9.1 of these. However, their readmission rates and percentage increase in nurses' perceptions of safety improvement were no better than 48 control hospitals'. Thus, we investigated drivers of successful program implementation within the set of treatment hospitals. We found that managers from hospitals with low and high perceived improvement identified similar numbers of problems. However, high perceived improvement hospitals took action on more problems. We found no benefit from selecting problems with the highest benefit-tocost ratios because there was a flat landscape for problems' benefit-to-cost ratios. Thus, for safety improvement in hospitals, allocating resources to search for and select high benefit/cost problems appears to be of limited benefit versus allocating resources to take action on known problems. This approach also aligns with how managers actually selected problems for resolution efforts: problems that were easy to solve were more likely to be selected.
Introduction
Process improvement (PI) refers to any systematic program to improve organizational routines with the goal of enhancing performance. Although manufacturing firms have used PI for decades, service firms have been slower to adopt these practices (Douglas and Fredenall, 2004) . In this paper, we focus on PI in hospitals because of the striking need for improvement in this service industry.
In the late 1980's, healthcare thought-leaders advocated adopting PI techniques used by manufacturing firms to improve quality of care and efficiency in hospitals (Berwick, 1991 , Laffel and Blumenthal, 1989 , Nolan et al., 1996 . Enthusiasm for PI in hospitals quickly stalled, in part because most implementations focused on improving administrative rather than clinical processes (Blumenthal and Kilo, 1998) . However, the Institute of Medicine's claim that medical errors caused as many as 100,000 deaths in the U. S. per year (1999) reignited interest in using PI to improve patient safety in hospitals. Unfortunately, despite some progress, experts agree that substantial opportunities to improve safety still exist at most hospitals (Leape et al., 2009 , Pronovost et al., 2006 , Wachter, 2010 .
Many PI programs involve frontline employees-employees who interact directly with customers or products the customers purchase-in the activities to improve processes. We refer to this type of PI as "frontline process improvement" (FLPI). Research has found that successful FLPI requires senior manager involvement Fredenall, 2004, Weiner et al., 1997) . "Management By Wandering
Around" (MBWA) is a FLPI program that requires manager involvement (Peters and Waterman, 2004) .
For MBWA, senior managers go to their organization's frontlines to observe and talk with employees.
The purpose is to generate a list of problems and improvement ideas, which we refer to interchangeably.
MBWA can surface more problems than the organization can solve given its limited human and financial resources (Frankel et al., 2008, Repenning and Sterman, 2002) . This potential imbalance highlights a tradeoff. On one hand, managers could focus resources on generating as many improvement ideas as possible, even if they can't solve all of them. Having a large number of ideas enables managers to analyze problem frequency and severity (Leape, 2002) . Using these data, managers can identify the most important problems and prioritize these for solution efforts (Bagian et al., 2001 ). Furthermore, managers may be reluctant to take action based on unfiltered employee reports, preferring to take action only when trends emerge from a large number of ideas submitted by a cross section of employees. This orientation toward analysis is evident in hospitals' use of voluntary incident reporting systems (Milch et al., 2006) , which was recommended as a key component of patient safety systems in the Institute of Medicine's report (1999) . Two oft-noted challenges with voluntary reporting are increasing employees' willingness to report problems so that the most important problems are accurately revealed and paying for data collection and analysis, which can be significant (Johnson, 2003 , Leape, 2002 .
On the other hand, managers could focus resources on solving problems from the stock of known problems (Johnson, 2003, Repenning and Sterman, 2002) . This limits the number of improvement ideas so that it better aligns with available problem solving resources (Bohn, 2000) . Prior research has found that frontline staff more willingly engage in the discretionary behaviors required for PI if they believe that managers will act on their ideas (Gandhi et al., 2005, Morrison and Phelps, 1999) . Soliciting more PI ideas than the organization has resources to solve may lead to cynicism and a lack of participation in future efforts (Tucker, 2007) . Furthermore, research on accidents found that small problems combine to cause major accidents, but that it is difficult to predict which problems will be involved (Reason, 1990) .
Therefore, resources may be better spent solving known problems rather than identifying problems with the goal of solving those with the highest impact (Johnson, 2003) .
This paper contributes to the FLPI literature by investigating the tradeoff between (1) solicitation and analysis of improvement ideas versus (2) taking action on existing problems. First, we test the overall effectiveness of MBWA by comparing 20 hospitals randomly selected to participate in an MBWA program to 48 randomly selected control hospitals that did not participate in the program. Second, we test factors that drive differences in performance among the organizations that adopted MBWA. We studied MBWA because it has recently gained popularity as a way to improve patient safety in hospitals and has been effective in some, but not all organizations (Frankel, et al., 2008) . Third, we investigate problem characteristics associated with selection for solution efforts.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
In this section, we draw on the PI, innovation and patient safety literatures to develop hypotheses about how selection of problems for solution effort impacts the success of a MBWA PI program. Our hypotheses assess the relationships of (1) participation in the MBWA program and performance improvement; (2) the overall managerial approach to PI and implementation success; and (3) problem characteristics and their selection for solution efforts.
Participation in MBWA
We first consider the impact of a structured FLPI program on performance. Research has found that FLPI can positively impact organizational outcomes, such as financial performance (Hendricks and Singhal, 2001, Powell, 1995) . The theoretical explanation is that employees' ideas are an untapped source of knowledge that can be harnessed to improve organizational processes and culture (Arthur and AimanSmith, 2001, Kim, 2005) . For example, Arthur and Aiman-Smith's (2001) study of a four-year FLPI program found that employees' early improvement ideas were fruitful, quick fix ideas, such as switching to a cheaper supplier. Later, employees' suggestions involved substantial, systematic changes in how work was performed, such as modifying the stacking patterns of completed parts at an upstream process 4 step to eliminate wasteful restacking of the material at a downstream step. The researchers argued that the program had the dual benefit of creating substantial improvement in work processes and moving the organization toward a learning-oriented culture.
Despite some compelling success stories, many FLPI efforts fail (Choi and Behling, 1997) . Research on the dynamics of PI suggests that implementation failures stem from devoting too many resources to production, which improves performance in the short term, versus to improvement, which improves performance in the long term (Repenning and Sterman, 2002) . When faced with a productivity gap, managers typically increase short term productivity by cutting corners. However, to sustainably close the performance gap, managers should counter intuitively decrease short term productivity by devoting resources to improvement efforts, which yield benefits in the long term (Repenning and Sterman, 2002) .
Given the high failure rate of FLPI programs, scholars have sought to identify key factors associated with implementation success. The factors most commonly noted are senior management commitment, training, data measurement, customer and supplier management, and employee empowerment (Choi and Behling, 1997 , Fryer et al., 2007 , Stock et al., 2007 , Taylor and Wright, 2003 , Weiner, et al., 1997 . Of these, the most dominant factor is senior management commitment (Weiner, et al., 1997) .
Management commitment may be important for FLPI because it ensures sufficient resources will be devoted to improvement efforts and will be sustained through the "worse before better" cycle described above (Repenning and Sterman, 2002) . It also fosters employee participation by providing confidence that positive change will result from their efforts (Morrison and Phelps, 1999) . Finally, it provides strategic oversight needed for negotiating solutions that cross organizational boundaries (Pronovost et al., 2004) .
Despite consensus about the importance of senior management commitment, scant research has investigated interventions designed to increase it. To address this gap, we studied MBWA, a systematic program in which senior managers observe frontline employees, solicit ideas about improving quality, safety or efficiency, and help frontline employees implement a subset of the identified improvement ideas (Frankel, et al., 2008 , Pronovost, et al., 2004 . This program is designed to increase senior management commitment to FLPI by assigning them a significant, active role. By seeing problems in context, managers should gain a better understanding of the negative impact of these problems and therefore be motivated to help resolve the issues (von Hippel, 1994) .
We hypothesized that MBWA would improve PI performance through the performance gains that accrue from implementing employees' ideas for improvement. Research also suggested that it would improve PI performance indirectly by signaling to frontline staff that the organization was serious about improving processes. Visible manager commitment increases employees' beliefs that leadership places a high value on safety, which in turn influences employees to engage in safer, but more time-consuming, discretionary behaviors (McFadden et al., 2009, Zohar and Luria, 2003) . Over time, this increase in 5 beneficial, discretionary behaviors by frontline staff improves performance. We thus hypothesize that MBWA will have a positive impact on PI performance compared with organizations that did not participate in the MBWA program. Testing this hypothesis is a contribution because, to our knowledge, although studies have documented the success of MBWA in some hospitals that already had senior manager commitment (Frankel, et al., 2008) 
Problem Solving Orientation
Field-based research studies that examined FLPI programs found that an organization's orientation to PI, especially regarding selection of problems for solution efforts, impacts implementation success (MacDuffie, 1997 , Mukherjee et al., 1998 , Stata, 1989 . We draw on innovation and problem solving theory to consider two contrasting orientations, which represent the inclination toward analysis versus action, i.e., toward investing scarce problem-solving resources in (a) identifying problems and prioritizing them with the goal of solving maximum-value problems versus (b) solving known problems, even if lower-value. The organizational learning literature has discussed a similar tradeoff between exploring new opportunities versus exploiting existing capabilities (March, 1991) .
Analysis Orientation.
Innovation tournaments attempt to discover a high-potential idea by generating a large number of ideas, the majority of which are discarded (Girotra et al., 2010, Terwiesch and Xu, 2008) . The goal is to discover and develop a few ideas with the highest expected profitability (Girotra, et al., 2010) . Expected profitability is predicted revenue generated by the innovation divided by the cost of developing the innovation (Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009) .
Similarly, the PI literature proposes soliciting many improvement ideas and selecting for solution efforts the subset that accounts for the majority of the negative impact, taking into account the anticipated costs of solving the problems. This advice assumes that there is a subset of problems with disproportionately high benefit-to-cost ratios, which for brevity we refer to as benefit/cost. This belief, sometimes referred to as the "Pareto Principle" (PP), states that a "few contributors to the cost [of poor quality] are responsible for the bulk of the cost. These vital few contributors need to be identified so that quality improvement resources can be concentrated on those areas." (Juran & Gryna, 1988, page 22.19 ).
The PP holds that a vital few (around 20%) of the problems cause the majority share (around 80%) of the negative impact (Krajewski et al., 2010) . Juran claims that there are always a vital few issues if one analyzes the data correctly, for example, by type of defect. Similarly, others have proposed that certain solutions, if implemented, would reduce cumulative problem occurrence by 80% (Stata, 1989) . Thus, the PP is believed to apply to individual problems, categories of problems, and categories of solutions.
This stream of research implies that managers can maximize the return on their limited problem solving resources by collecting a large dataset of problems, analyzing that dataset to identify the highest impact issues, and engaging in problem solving efforts on the selected few (Girotra, et al., 2010) . We refer to the inclination toward this philosophy as "Analysis orientation". We predict that organizations that concentrate on solving those problems with the highest benefit/cost will be more successful at PI than organizations that solve less impactful problems.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Hospitals that solve a higher percentage of the set of problems with the highest benefit-to-cost ratios will have better PI performance than hospitals that solve a lower percentage.
Action Orientation.
The second approach that we consider is allocating resources to solving known problems, even if they are small impact. We call an inclination toward this approach "Action orientation". It is characterized by fixing more problems, without regard to benefit/cost ratio and with few resources spent determining which problems are optimal to solve.
There are three reasons why an action orientation could outperform an analysis orientation. First, spending money prioritizing problems represents a real trade-off from devoting those resources to resolution efforts. Industry experts for analysis-oriented systems acknowledge that these systems are expensive to operate, and drain resources and managerial attention. For example, the US national Aviation Safety Reporting System spends $3 million per year analyzing the 30,000 generated reports, an average cost of $100 per report (Johnson, 2003) . Given that hospitals collectively generate many more reports-there are 850,000 reports per year generated by the UK's National Health System (Johnson, 2003) and 20,000 per year at just one of the 6,000 US hospitals (Wachter, 2009 ) -spending money on analyzing and prioritizing events can represent a significant drain on the ability of organizations to instead devote those resources to resolving problems. Dr. Wachter from the University of California, San Francisco, for example, estimates that his hospital spends $1.6 million per year on incident reports (2009).
Much of this cost is for analysis rather than action, so the underlying causes of the problems do not get addressed. A survey of 2,050 US hospitals found that 98% had incident reporting systems, but only 2% discussed incidents reported with all three of the key leadership groups-administrators, nurses, and physicians-needed to resolve the problems (Farley et al., 2008) . Thus, we conclude that an action orientation, the tendency to spend a higher percentage of resources resolving problems than prioritizing them, differs significantly from an analysis orientation, with important repercussions for PI performance.
A second benefit of an action orientation is greater employee engagement. Research on FLPI has found that employees become discouraged if management does not take action on known problems (MacDuffie, 1997) . Thus, asking employees to identify more issues than the organization has resources to solve can create cynicism, which negatively impacts organizational culture (Clarke, 1999) . In addition, the pressure of having more problems than can be solved can create a firefighting culture where problems are patched rather than truly solved (Bohn, 2000) . Conversely, an action orientation can create a positive dynamic where employees surface increasingly meaningful issues and devote more time to PI, which improves performance (Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 2001, Repenning and Sterman, 2001 ).
Third, research on industrial accidents, which shows that major accidents stem from small problems that align in an unfortunate sequence rather than from one major failure (Reason, 1990) , also supports an action orientation. The difficulty of predicting which specific problems will combine in a catastrophic way increases the challenge of assessing the benefit of removing the underlying causes of a problem, reducing the ability to accurately prioritize problems. Therefore, organizations may gain more by allocating resources to remove known problems, rather than to identification, analysis and prioritization efforts because one cannot know in advance which specific problems will contribute to the next accident.
Eventually, however, the incremental value of solving additional problems diminishes. As underlying causes of problems get removed, the performance gap between desired performance and actual performance decreases, easing pressure to invest resources in PI (Repenning and Sterman, 2002) . In these situations, it is more beneficial to have employees focus on producing goods or services rather than on problem solving (Fine, 1986) . Therefore, we anticipate that there will be an inverted u-shaped relationship between the number of problems solved and performance.
Hypothesis 3 (H3).
There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between solving more problems and PI performance.
Problem selection
Differences in problem solving orientation influence which problems get selected for resolution efforts.
For example, MacDuffie's ethnographic study of problem solving in auto manufacturing plants found that differences in managers' problem solving orientation resulted in dramatic differences in which types of problems were addressed (1997). Analysis-oriented managers want to maximize the benefit gained from limited problem-solving resources and therefore select problems with the highest benefit/cost. The validity of this orientation is reinforced by the PI and innovation literatures, which advise managers to select the highest benefit/cost problems (Juran et al., 1999, Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009 More consistent with action-orientation, behavioral research questions whether people follow rational decision-making heuristics, such as selecting problems with the highest benefit/cost (Tversky and Kahneman, 1984) . Experimental research on people's actual decision-making behaviors finds that most people select options that maximize their short-term rather than long-term payoff (Bazerman, 1986) .
Muthlingham and colleagues' empirical study (2010) of the adoption of energy-efficiency-enhancing ideas by manufacturing firms provides insight into how the tendency to maximize short-term payoffs influences problem-solving decisions of managers. They found that managers implemented ideas that were inexpensive to solve in the short term rather than ideas that were more expensive initially, but over time, had a higher payoff. Similarly, MacDuffie's case study of three automobile manufacturers' PI programs found that Ford avoided solving a design flaw in the drip rail-the metal trim around the door opening that diverts rain water from leaking into the car-because it was expensive to make the lip of the metal rail longer, despite the fact that water leaks was the most frequent customer-reported defect according to J. D. Power (1997) . Thus, we predict that managers will be more likely to select problems that are cheaper to solve than those that are more expensive to solve, even if the benefit/cost is higher.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Problems that are less expensive to solve will be selected for solution efforts more than problems that are more expensive to solve.
Ease of solution is another problem characteristic that an action-oriented manager might use as a selection criterion to maximize short term payoff. Muthlingham et al. (2010) found that managers selected problems that could be resolved by subordinates, reducing the burden on managers' time. These problems can be considered easier to solve than more complex, boundary-crossing problems that require managerial involvement for solution efforts to be successful (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003) . Bohn recommends performing triage on the queue of problems (2000) . Although he does not provide guidance on what criteria to use for making triage decisions, his model suggests that time required to solve a problem is an important driver of the backlog of unsolved problems. Thus, all else equal, managers should select problems that require less time to solve compared to other problems. Building on these findings, we predict that easier problems will be selected for solution efforts relative to more difficult ones.
Hypothesis 6 (H6). Problems that are easier to solve will be selected for solution efforts more than problems that are more difficult to solve.
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Methodology
We test our hypotheses in a field study of U.S. hospitals that participated in a MBWA program to improve patient safety. The program was launched in January 2005 and lasted for 18 months. We drew on prior research to design the program (Frankel, et al., 2008 , Pronovost, et al., 2004 , Thomas et al., 2005 .
We describe the program, selection of intervention and control hospitals, and our data and analysis.
The MBWA Program
The MBWA program consisted of repeated cycles of senior manager-staff interaction, debriefing, and follow up. Senior managers, such as the Chief Executive, Operating, Medical, and Nursing Officers (CEO, COO, CMO, and CNO, respectively), interacted with frontline staff to generate, select, and solve improvement ideas. Their interactions took two forms: visits to observe work, which were called "work system visits"; and special meetings, called "safety forums," with larger groups of staff to discuss safety concerns. The two activities were conducted in the same work area, such as the emergency department. In work system visits, four senior managers would each spend 30 minutes to two hours visiting a particular work area to observe a person doing work. The senior managers would each observe a different role, such as a nurse, physician, patient, and respiratory therapist, to shed cross-disciplinary insight into the work done in the area. The purpose was to build senior managers' understanding of the frontline work context and gather real-time, grounded information about safety problems (Frankel, et al., 2008) . In addition to work system visits, managers also facilitated a safety forum in the work area. The safety forums were designed to enable a larger group of frontline workers from the work area to tell senior managers about their safety concerns and points of pride (Sobo and Sadler, 2002) . By supplementing work system visits with safety forums, the program addressed research suggesting that interaction with more frontline staff increases MBWA's positive impact on culture (Thomas, et al., 2005) .
The MBWA program continued with a "debrief meeting," which served to organize the information collected from the site visits and forum. The senior managers who interacted with frontline staff in the work area attended, as did the work area managers, selected frontline workers, and hospital patient safety officer. They compiled the improvement ideas identified through manager-staff interaction. Then they discussed the ideas and decided next steps, ranging from doing nothing to suggesting solutions and assigning responsibility. Managers were encouraged to communicate with staff about implementation efforts, describing what changes, if any, were made in response to identified ideas. The patient safety officers entered into an electronic spreadsheet, the ideas generated and actions taken and sent this spreadsheet to our research team for analysis.
Each round of these activities constituted one cycle. Each cycle focused on a specific work area of the hospital and took approximately three months to complete, approximately equivalent to the length of time reportedly required for PI teams to solve identified problems (Evans and Dean, 2003) . After completing a cycle, the management team would move to a different work area for another cycle. Senior management teams determined which work areas to visit based on their hospital's needs. Cycles continued over the 18-month implementation. On average, hospitals conducted cycles in 4 work areas, most commonly in the operating room or post anesthesia care unit (OR/PACU), intensive care unit (ICU), emergency department (ED), and medical/surgical ward (Ward).
Sample/ Recruitment
Our study employed a quasi-experimental design, including a pretest and posttest of treatment and control hospitals. We first drew a random sample of 92 US acute-care hospitals, stratified by size and geographic region. We provided no financial incentive; however, participation in our larger study on patient safety climate fulfilled a national accreditation requirement. At enrollment all hospitals were aware that they may be invited to participate in a program to improve patient safety, but details regarding the program were withheld to prevent contamination of the control hospitals. To select treatment hospitals to participate in the MBWA program, we drew a second, stratified, random sample of 24 hospitals from the sample of 92. Twenty-four was the maximum number of treatment hospitals our funding could support and we could oversee. The remaining 68 hospitals not selected for the MBWA program were "control hospitals." We use data from the control hospitals to test the effectiveness of the program. There was no difference between treatment and control hospitals on our outcome variable perceived improvement (described in detail below and in section 3.3.5) in 2004 (F=0.01, not significant; mean = 3.72, standard deviation (SD) = 0.37 for control hospitals, mean = 3.74 SD = 0.27 for treatment hospitals).
Data on perceived improvement were collected through surveys before implementation of PI activities (2004) and again after the program was completed (2006) . At each hospital, we surveyed a random 10% sample of frontline workers. We were required to survey only 10% and different frontline workers in 2004 and 2006 because the hospitals were concerned about the burden on frontline workers.
The baseline (2004) response rate was 52%; the follow-up (2006) response rate was 39%. For the analyses in this paper, we used data from nurses (n=1,420 in 2004 and n=1,570 in 2006) to mitigate perceptual differences due to differences in the disciplinary composition of participating organizations (Singer et al., 2009 (1) or not (0).
Benefit-to-Cost Ratio.
To test H2 and H4, we needed a measure for benefit/cost. We divided the estimated benefit of solving the problem (as measured by severity of its potential harm) by the estimated cost of solving the problem. To measure problem severity, we recruited ten experienced nurses (median = 4.5 years) from a graduate nursing program located in our city to independently rate the severity of the problems using a coding manual that we developed. The coding manual had a row for each of the ten values of severity (1 = no harm, 10 = potential for death) and four columns: the numerical value, a short label (e.g. "patient discomfort" for a level 3 severity), a detailed description of what types of things were included in that level, and an example problem that fit that value. To measure inter-rater reliability, we calculated the kappa statistic (Landis and Koch, 1977) by first having all ten nurses rate a subset of 58 ideas. Kappa values can range from -1, indicating complete disagreement, to 1, indicating perfect agreement. The combined kappa was 0.22, indicating fair agreement among raters (Landis and Koch, 1977) . We believe that this is adequate agreement for the following two reasons. In the context of innovation, which is judging the potential value of implementing an idea, different raters can have differing perceptions about the value of ideas and solutions and therefore a lower kappa value is not unexpected (Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009 ). Furthermore, the standard deviation across raters was only 1.4.
Given that our scale was ordinal, two ratings in adjacent categories (such as one rater assigning a 4 and a second rater assigning a 5) were very similar, though they would be considered completely different categories by the kappa statistic, making this statistic very conservative. After establishing agreement, at least four nurses rated the severity of each problem. The mean severity was 5.0. We also had a supplemental measure of severity that we used to validate the ratings. In the data collection spreadsheet, we had included three columns related to prioritizing the problems. One of these asked hospitals to assess the safety risk of each problem generated on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being low to no risk, 3 mild discomfort, 5 would require intervention, and 10 could cause harm or death. Ten hospitals scored their problems for safety risk. The correlation between the hospital-rating of safety risk and the nurses' rating of severity was significant, lending support for the validity of our severity measure (=.24, p<.001).
To measure solution cost, which was necessary to calculate benefit/cost and also to test H5, the authors individually rated the cost of solving each problem using a scale from 1 (low), 2 (medium), and 3 (high). We compared scores and discussed our rationale until we reached consensus. To facilitate agreement, we assigned dollar values to the scale: 1 = solution cost < $500, 2 = solution cost > $500 and < $150,000, and 3 = solution cost >$150,000. For solutions that required consumable purchases, such as soap to refill dispensers, we included the cost of a year's supply of the consumable material.
We used the 1-3 scale and the consensus process to measure two kinds of costs: (1) anticipated cost of solving a problem and (2) cost of the actual solution, if any, implemented by the hospital. To measure anticipated solution cost, which was the variable we used to calculate benefit/cost, we estimated what it would cost to solve the underlying causes of that problem, using the description of the problem. To measure actual solution cost, we used the description of actions taken by the hospital, if any. We used actual solution cost as control variable, described in the control variable section below. After obtaining estimates of severity and anticipated solution cost for each problem, we calculated the benefit/cost ratio by dividing the severity by the cost. The maximum possible benefit/cost was 10, and the lowest was 0.33.
To test H2, we calculated three different benefit/cost measures to correspond to the three methods of analyzing data advocated by Juran (1999) : individual problems, types of problems, types of solutions.
These measures were necessary to test the hypothesis that better outcomes would be associated with solving a subset that collectively accounted for 80% of the total benefit/cost identified in a work area. This is because the subset could be the set of highest benefit/cost (1) individual problems, (2) categories of problems, or (3) types of solutions As a first step in doing this, using the same process for reaching agreement that we used for solution costs, we coded each problem into one of 11 problem types:
Communication, Equipment, Facility, Infection Control, Medication Administration, Policy or Procedure, Slow Response Time, Security, Staffing-related, Task Management such as interruptions, and Other (citation omitted for review). We also coded each problem into the primary of eight types of solutions:
Training, Purchase or restock supplies, Change procedures, Staffing changes (e.g. hiring additional people), Maintenance, Redesign of physical space, Communication/ documentation/ information technology changes, and Other. The categories emerged from the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998 we calculated the percentage of the cumulative benefit/cost ratio from the top 80% individual problems that was solved and the percentage of the cumulative benefit/cost ratio from the not top 80% that was solved. We included these two variables in the regression equation to test the impact on performance of solving the highest benefit/cost individual problems. We used the percentage of the cumulative benefit/cost solved rather than the percentage of problems that were solved to take into account that all problems might not be equally important, and to place greater weight on solving problems with higher benefit/cost. We also conducted this analysis with severity of problems and a standardized version of benefit/cost and got similar results.
We followed a similar process for problem and solution types. For problem (solution) type, we first found the sum of the benefit/cost values for the problems in that type and used those values to rank order the types in descending order. We calculated the cumulative sum of the total benefit/cost up to and including that type. We calculated for each type, the cumulative percentage, i.e., the cumulative sum divided by the grand total. For descriptive purposes, we calculated what percentage of types needed to be solved to obtain 80% of the total benefit/cost. We created a variable whose value was 1 for problems that were in a "top 80% problem type" (solution type), and 0 otherwise. For each work area, we calculated the percentage of cumulative benefit/cost from the top 80 problem types (solution types) and from the not top 80 problem types (solution types) that were solved. We used these four variables in our regressions.
Average number of problems solved.
To test H3, we coded a problem as having solution effort if there was evidence that action was taken to address the problem. Our coding was validated by a second measure, "average solution effectiveness", which we explain in more detail in section 3.3.6. The average solution effectiveness was 5.9 for solved problems ("solution action in progress") and 2.7 ("no solution implemented") for unsolved problems, lending credibility to our coding. We summed the number of problems addressed by solution efforts in each work area to create a measure of the total number of problems solved in the work area. We averaged the total number of problems solved across all work areas for each hospital to create the hospital-level variable we used in our analyses.
Difficulty of Solution.
To test H6, we used data from the ten hospitals that completed the prioritization columns we had provided in the spreadsheet. One of these measured difficulty of solution, where 1 = easy, can be done within 30 days; 2 = moderate, multiple departments' approval required, 90 days; and 3 = difficult, multiple departments, process changes, and major budget, 6 months. Using a 5-point Likert response scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree, we asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with items such as "Overall, the level of patient safety at this facility is improving" and "The overall quality of service at this facility is improving." Agreement with these items indicated that respondents thought quality and safety were improving. The scale exhibited We calculated ICC and rwg to test whether hospital-level aggregation of perceived improvement was appropriate, The mean interrater agreement score (r WG ) for nurses' rating of perceived improvement was 0.60, which is sufficient for aggregation (Zellmer-Bruhn, 2003 (Bliese, 2000) .
We used a perceptual measure of improvement because safety is the absence of problems, which makes it challenging to measure objectively (Gaba 2003) . In this case, employee perceptions may provide the best information about whether processes are improving because employees are embedded in the work processes and know if system failures are becoming less frequent. Furthermore, the hospitals in our study were unwilling to share confidential data about safety incidents with us.
Our second outcome variable was the average of two standardized rates of patient readmissions. We took the mean of the standardized, risk-adjusted readmission rate for patients admitted to the hospital in 2005 with a primary diagnosis of congestive heart failure (CHF) who were readmitted for any reason to the hospital within 30 days of being discharged and the same measure for patients with a primary diagnosis of pneumonia (PNM). These data were publically available from Medicare Hospital Compare For H1, the only significant control variable was hospital tax status (not for profit; 1=not for profit tax status, 0 = otherwise). For H2 and H3 regressions with the outcome variable of perceived improvement, the significant control variables were average effectiveness of solution efforts (Ave Solution Effectiveness, explained below) and percentage of problems for which a senior manager such as the CEO, COO, CNO, or CMO was assigned responsibility for solution efforts (% Sr Mgr Assigned). With the readmissions outcome variable, the significant controls were the ratio of full-time equivalent nursing hours to patient days (RN hrs), and if the hospital was a major teaching hospital (teaching; 1=yes, 0 = no).
For H2 and H3, to control for the alternative hypothesis that our results were driven by the quality of solutions implemented, we asked the ten independent nurses to rate solution effectiveness for the hospitals' solution for each idea. The scale ranged from 1 to 10, with 1 being "no information given" and 10 being "systemic fix" that would prevent recurrence. The average solution effectiveness was 5
("problem is being investigated"), with an average SD of 1.2 and kappa of 0.23.
For H3, to control for the possibility that the positive results stemmed not from solving more problems, but from spending more money, we controlled for hospital spending on solution efforts. To create this variable, we used our estimate of the actual solution costs and converted it to a dollar figure by multiplying the 1's by $250, the 2's by $5,000, and the 3's by $150,000. We removed duplicate solutions, such as implementation of a new computer system, where one solution was listed for multiple problems. For each work area, we summed the dollar values to get total dollars spent on solutions.
Finally, for each hospital we found the median cumulative dollar value of actual solutions in a work area.
However, this control variable was not significant in any of the equations, nor did its inclusion change our results, and therefore for parsimony we omit it from our final analyses.
For H4 and H5, our large sample size enabled us to include the following control variables: a set of dummy variables for the work areas where the problem was identified (e.g. ICU, ED), a set of dummy variables for the type of activity during which the problem was identified (e.g. site visit, safety forum, or both), a set of dummy variables for the 11 types of problem (e.g. medication-related) and the order in which the work area was visited in the MBWA program (e.g. 1= first work area to get the MBWA intervention at the hospital, 2 = the second, etc.). The only significant relationships were as follows:
problems identified from a safety forum or both the safety forum and the work system visit were more likely to be selected for solution efforts; problem types "task management" and "other" were less likely to be selected for solution efforts; and problems from work areas that were visited later in the sequence were less likely to be selected for solution efforts. For H6, our sample size was smaller with only 364 problems from ten hospitals. Thus, we created two new control variables that more parsimoniously reflected the significant control variables from H4 & H5: a binary variable for whether the problem was identified through a safety forum or both a safety forum and site visit (1 = yes, 0 = no); and a binary variable for whether the problem was in the problem category of task management or other (1 = yes, 0 = no). We also included the control variable for sequence.
Testing our Hypotheses
We used Stata 11.1™ to test our hypotheses. To test H1, we compared hospital level performance between intervention and control hospitals. H2 and H3 tested the impact of treatment hospitals' problem solving orientation on performance using hospital-level variables from the spreadsheet of safety problems. For H1-H3, we used linear regression analysis with robust standard errors (Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt, 2004). We tested H4-H6 using the individual problem-level data set. We used multilevel mixedeffects logistic regression (xtmelogit), with problems nested in work areas and work areas nested in hospitals Skrondal, 2005, StataCorp, 2007) . Because difficulty of solution was provided by only ten hospitals, this regression has a smaller sample size than the first model.
Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis
We visited each treatment hospital to observe prescribed MBWA activities, such as a work system visit or a safety forum. In addition, we discussed and observed specific examples of changes implemented in response to problems identified through the program to verify accuracy of the data that the hospitals submitted to us. There were no discrepancies. We also interviewed frontline staff, department managers and the CEO. Interview questions addressed the nature of PI in the hospital in general and as it related to the implementing MBWA. For example, we asked senior managers how they viewed their role in patient safety. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. After each visit, investigators wrote a journal of the day's activities based on notes taken throughout the day. The journal and interviews were combined into a transcript, which provided qualitative data on the nature of the hospital's PI process.
We coded the transcripts using the procedure described in Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 58-62) . We initially used a list of codes based on our interview questions. We read the transcripts multiple times, revising the codes as we deepened our understanding of similarities and contrasts among the hospitals' implementation of the program. Three main themes emerged: (1) how the hospital managers prioritized problems for solution efforts; (2) the strength of the MBWA implementation; (3) and the strength of the CEO's role in patient safety. One author went through the transcripts to select all relevant quotes for each hospital for each of the three themes. For theme 1, she developed categories describing different types of prioritization. For themes 2 and 3, she developed a coding scheme from 1=weak, 2=moderate, 3=strong
and provided descriptors. Both authors independently rated each hospital's set of quotes while blinded from the hospital's performance results using the relevant coding scheme. Each hospital received an overall rating for each theme. We compared ratings and discussed each theme at each hospital to come to consensus. We use the qualitative results to better understand differences in performance.
Results
We begin with descriptive statistics from the implementation of the MBWA program. We also discuss the distribution of problems, types of problems, and solutions. These are followed by the regression results.
Descriptive Statistics about Identified Problems and Solutions
Treatment hospitals conducted activities in an average of 4.7 work areas. The most frequent problem types were related to equipment (18%), facility (17%), communication (16%) and staffing (16%). The most frequent solutions were policy/procedure changes (17%), training (16%), and purchasing supplies (14%). Tables 5 and 6 show a sample of problems and their solutions. Hospitals identified an average of 17.3 problems per work area and took action on 9. The average benefit/cost was 4.1 for all problems.
Regarding the distribution of benefit/cost, most work areas in our dataset did not identify a set of problems that fit the PP, but instead had a more flat distribution. On average, a work area had to solve an average of 11.4 problems, or 65% of identified problems to capture 81% of the cumulative benefit/cost.
Similarly, grouping the data by types of problems, a work area would need to solve 57% of the problem types identified to get 81% of the cumulative impact. Finally, grouping by solution type, work areas would need to implement an average of 55% of the solution types to get 81% of the cumulative benefit/cost. Figure 1a shows the histogram of the benefit/costs of individual problems from a typical work area, Hospital 47, work area 42. This work area was close to the dataset's average: % of problems needed to be solved to get 80% benefit (ave: 65%, #42 = 66%), number of problems identified (ave: 17, #42=15), and solved (ave: 9, #42=5). Solid bars signify the problem was solved, and solid borders signify the problem was in the top 80%. Table 1 . The mean percentage change in perceived improvement scores was 2% for treatment hospitals (SD=10%, Min=-16%, Max 32%) and 1%
for control hospitals (S=11%, Min=-25%, Max 41%). On average, the percentage of the total benefit/cost solved from the top 80% category was 58% for individual problems (SD=31%), 57% for problem types (SD=29%), and 57% for solution types (SD=30%). For the not top80% categories, on average hospitals solved 55% of the total benefit/cost for all three measures (SD = 26% for individual problems, 35% for problem type, and 29% for solution types).
Insert Table 1 about here Four hospitals solved 75% or more of the cumulative benefit/cost in the top 80% of individual problems; we labeled these hospitals analysis-oriented. Among the four, % change in perceived improvement was above average for two (Hosp 65, 100) and below average for two (Hosp 55, 105) . Five hospitals solved 9 or more problems per work area on average; we labeled them action-oriented. Two were above average on % change in perceived improvement (Hosp 32, 119), one was below average (Hosp122) and two were average (Hosp 47, 116). Four hospitals were both analysis and action-oriented.
Two were above average on % change in perceived improvement (Hosp 39, 88), one was below average (Hosp 9) and one was average (Hosp 121). Seven used neither. Three were below average on % change in perceived improvement (Hosp 72, 131, 144), three were average (Hosp 82, 106, 129), and one was above average (Hosp 34). Average % change in perceived improvement was directionally aligned with our hypotheses, but the large standard deviation within each cell made the differences non-significant (neither: mean=-2%, SD=9.5%; analysis-oriented mean=0.7%, SD=7.1%; action-oriented: mean=1.4%, SD=5.6%; both mean=11%, SD=16%, ANOVA F = 1.51, Prob>F = 0.25). Tables 2 and 3 shows the results from testing H2, whether solving a higher percentage of the cumulative benefit/cost from the set of individual problems that account for the top 80% of the cumulative benefit/cost was associated with better performance. H2 was not supported for either percentage change in perceived improvement or readmission. On the contrary, solving a higher percentage of the not top 80% was marginally associated with better performance (=.191, p<.10 for perceived improvement; = -1.53, p<.10 for readmission).
Effect of Implementation of MBWA on Performance (H1-H3)
Model 3 in the tables shows the regression results from testing the impact of solving a higher percentage of the benefit/cost in the top 80% types of problems. Again, H2 is not supported as solving a higher percentage of the benefit/cost from the top 80% is marginally associated with higher readmission rates (=1.482, p<.10 for readmission). Conversely, solving a higher percentage of the not top80% problem types is marginally associated with better performance (=.098, p<.10 for perceived improvement; =- To estimate the number of problems at which the benefit of solving problems begins to decrease, we created a graph with percentage change in perceived improvement on the y-axis and the number of problems solved on the x-axis. We estimated percentage change in perceived improvement by using the average values for the other variables in the equation multiplied by their regression coefficients and indexing the number of problems solved by 1 and multiplying by its coefficient for the regular term. We also added in the square of the number of problems multiplied by its coefficient. We followed a similar procedure for readmissions. As the graphs in Figure 2 show, work areas benefited from solving up to 17 problems, after which percentage change in perceived improvement declined. The relationship between readmissions and number of problems solved was more linear. To summarize, our results show that hospitals that solved a higher number of problems, up to 17, had better performance on percentage change in perceived improvement and readmissions, independent of whether the problems they selected for solution were the highest impact problems. Solving a higher percentage of the benefit/cost in the top 80 is associated with worse performance because it is associated with higher rates of readmissions.
20
The percent of problems for which senior managers were assigned responsibility was associated with perceived improvement (=.313, p<.001 in Model 6). There was no association between this variable and readmission. Therefore, we excluded it from our models with the outcome variable of readmission.
Insert Table 2 about here   Insert Table 3 
Effect of Problem Characteristics on Selection for Solution Effort (H4-H6)
Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the results for H4 to H6. Model 1 tests H4 and H5 using a sample of 1176 problems from 74 work areas in 18 hospitals. The smaller number of hospitals compared with H2
and H3 was due to missing data from some hospitals about the sequence in which the work areas were visited, which we included as a control variable in these models. 
Qualitative Data Analysis
We analyzed the qualitative data to better understand what accounted for success in implementing MBWA. Although we analyzed data from all 20 hospitals, to draw clearer distinctions we present only the seven top (Table 5) and bottom (Table 6 ) performing hospitals with respect to percentage change in perceived improvement. To better display the patterns in the data, we group the better perceived (Table 5) and worse perceived (Table 6 ) hospitals together using the multiple-case, conceptually-ordered, matrix display described by Miles and Huberman (1994) . On average, the better perceived hospitals increased their perceived improvement scores by 13%, while the worse perceived hospitals deteriorated by 7%.
Strength of MBWA implementation (1=weak to 3=strong) significantly differentiated the two groups (better: ave=2.6, SD=.45; worse: ave=1.4, SD=.48, t test=-4.9, p<.001). Interestingly, variables such as the number of work areas visited and the number of problems identified did not differ significantly between the two groups (p values of the two t-tests were both >0.10). Thus, it was not that the worse perceived hospitals did fewer of the MBWA program components. Instead, the qualitative data suggest that the managers of the better perceived hospitals valued the learning that was generated by the work system visits and acknowledged the issues raised by the frontline staff. For example, at Strathfield Hospital, the most improved hospital in our sample, the COO commented on what she learned by doing the work system visits. She recalled a site visit to the ER where she observed how difficult it was for the nurses to prepare medications in the extremely small medication room. She said, "It's a little thing, but when you actually see them doing the process, you say, 'What a minute, that is difficult for them.'"
In contrast, the managers from the worse perceived hospitals were cynical about learning anything from observing frontline work and were reluctant to act on frontline staff concerns that had not been through a validation process, such as gathering data from multiple sources, or proving its existence. At Gerlos Hospital, which was among the worse hospitals, while reviewing the list of problems identified in the maternity ward, the CFO expressed his skepticism about the validity of the issues raised by frontline staff. All of the patients' phone calls were routed through the nursing station, resulting in nurses spending considerable time routing personal phone calls to patients' rooms. He stated, "They [the frontline staff] need to prove first that it [interruptions from having to answer patients' personal phone calls] is a real problem." His skepticism of frontline staff's concerns illustrated the lack of action taking at Gerlos.
The strength of MBWA implementation strongly correlated with CEOs' views of their role in patient safety (=.68, p<.01). On a scale of 1=worst to 3=best, the better perceived hospitals had a higher rating for CEO role in patient safety than the worse hospitals (better: ave=2.1, SD=.18; worse: ave=1.7, SD=.1, t test=-2.08, p=.03). In both groups, the CEOs regarded patient safety and their role in the safety effort as important. Differences between the two groups were subtle. CEOs from the better perceived hospitals viewed themselves as active members of the team responsible for improving patient safety. In contrast, at the worse hospitals there was a passive attitude toward improvement efforts. Instead of being actively engaged in ensuring that the hospital was improving, these CEOs viewed the change process as being in the hands of other people, either the physicians, the board, or external agencies. For example, at Hamilton General, one of the worse perceived hospitals, the CEO stated, "If I am not a leader speaking out about patient safety, then the institution is not going to see that as a goal. I have to believe in patient safety and preach it to the best of my ability." This quote illustrates passion about his role in speaking about safety, but not in being an active team member responsible for making changes. There is evidence that his speaking about safety did not translate into action taking by the organization. The senior managers delegated responsibility for work system visits to the mid-level managers, and the mid-level managers did not want to do more visits than their peers. The PI coordinator explained, "It was hard to get a lot of enthusiasm. As we went through, our volunteers dwindled. If they had done it once, they didn't want to go again until everyone else had gone at least once." The result was that Hamilton General conducted many work system visits, but only by forcing direct subordinates to do the visits. Without anyone taking responsibility, the hospital's performance worsened. A second example of senior manager failure to take primary responsibility for patient safety comes from St. Francis, another poorly perceived hospital. The CEO stated, "I let the medical staff handle their business and at the appropriate time I may weigh in and say, 'You guys really want to allow this?'" As a final example, the Vice President of Darby Hospital viewed his hospital's patient safety performance as being hindered by a weak team of middle managers, and saw his role in improving patient safety as firing the poor performers. In contrast, at the better perceived hospitals, the CEO viewed himself or herself as leading the effort, or as an active team member along with other managers. This is illustrated by the CEO of Springville Hospital, who stated, "I provide leadership by being involved, informing people, and being responsive when there are safety issues."
Finally, qualitative coding of prioritization of problems for solution efforts yielded interesting differences between the two groups. Better performing hospitals tried to fix as many problems as they could. For example, a nurse at Randolph Regional described the hospital's process for acting on employee suggestions, "Any team member who sees something that could prohibit patient safety can submit the idea, and it gets sent out for review to the applicable departments. It gets voted on and implemented if they think it is a good idea." Similarly, at Brookhaven, their safety officer described the senior managers' views toward the PI program, "Once they [the senior managers] got this list of things that needed to be addressed, they wanted to address them all. They didn't want to focus on one or two. They just wanted to do everything. They felt that the staff expected that."
Hospitals used different strategies to have the capability of addressing many problems. One approach was to use interim solutions if the best solution required a long-lead time. For example, one of the problems identified at Hanover Hospital was the configuration of the emergency department waiting room blocked visibility of patients from the nurses, which was both a patient safety and employee safety concern. This problem was going to be addressed in the longer term by the planned renovation of the emergency department, but in the meantime, the hospital added security personnel to the waiting area.
Another approach was breaking large, expensive projects into more manageable pieces. Pondview
Hospital, for example, renovated one of its long-term care rooms every few months, which cost $5,000
for a new bed, chair, and tray table, because they could not afford to renovate all of the long-term care rooms at one time. However, they slowly made progress on the renovation.
Conversely, at many of the hospitals that deteriorated on perceived improvement, an emphasis on prioritizing problems limited solution efforts. First, at some of these hospitals, prioritization created a high hurdle for problems to be acknowledged or if they were acknowledged, to be selected for solution efforts. For example, at Hamilton General, they focused on solving a few items and explained away the other problems as "unsolvable". Their PI program liaison said, "Do you want to pick a few items to really follow up on?" As they discussed the list of problems, she discarded many of them as insolvable. "I think the main thing is the nursing shortage and not our staffing ratio. We are trying to get in more nurses, but it is a nationwide shortage, so there is really no solution at present." Second, the process of prioritizing problems took significant time and energy away from solution efforts, or was a process step that stalled forward progress. Thus, for the seven worse perceived hospitals, the process of prioritization became a stumbling block for action. For example, during our visit to Tall Pines Community Hospital, they commented that they planned on having a meeting in two weeks to discuss priorities, assign accountability and follow up with staff to let them know what is planned. To our knowledge, the problems were never resolved. Similarly, at St. Frances Medical Center their safety officer stated, "We identified what the priorities were, based on feedback from the departments, supervisors and some of the staff. I sent that information back to the department so they would know certain things had a timeline that we had assigned. I don't know if there has been follow-through since then or not."
Insert Table 5 about here
Insert Table 6 about here
Discussion and Implications
In this paper, we investigated critical success factors for one type of FLPI, MBWA, which has recently begun being deployed by hospitals. Using data from 68 US hospitals, we found that participating in the MBWA program did not improve average performance according to nurses' perceptions any more than not participating. There also was no difference between the two groups on rates of readmission for congestive heart failure and pneumonia. Our inability to show results highlights two challenges of using randomized control trial design for studying PI. First, control organizations can work on improving performance too. For example, during the study period the Institute for Healthcare Improvement launched a major safety campaign in which many hospitals participated (Berwick et al., 2006) . Second, as our qualitative data suggest, managers' mental models impact the effectiveness of the treatment.
We also explored critical determinants of successful implementation within the set of 20 MBWA hospitals. We examined the tradeoff between an orientation toward analysis versus action, i.e., to improve patient safety by identifying a large number of problems with the goal of solving only the highest leverage problems versus by solving as many problems as possible. We found that taking action on more problems identified in the unit was associated with lower readmissions. It was also associated with increased perceived improvement, up to 17 solved problems per unit, after which the benefit from solving more problems decreased. We controlled for the amount of money spent on solving problems. It was not significant, ruling out the alternate explanation that spending more money accounted for better outcomes.
Solving a higher percentage of the high benefit/cost problems was not associated with increased perceived improvement or with lower readmissions. This may be because there was not a smaller set of individual problems, type of problem, or solution type that would give a disproportionately high return if solved.
Instead, hospitals needed to resolve around 65% of the problems to get an 80% benefit. Thus, spending resources to discover and solve high impact problems through programs like MBWA or incident reports, may not yield anticipated gains. Furthermore, an action orientation was better aligned with how managers actually selected problems for solution efforts. Our data showed that managers were more likely to select problems that were easy to solve, rather than selecting problems with a high benefit/cost.
Our qualitative analysis sheds insight into senior managers' inclination for action. We find that hospitals with higher perceived improvement scores had senior managers who viewed the MBWA program as a way to learn valuable information about potential safety issues in their hospital and viewed themselves as active participants in efforts to improve patient safety. This contrasts with the worse perceived hospitals where senior leaders' skepticism about frontline employees' concerns and a "prove to me that the problem is worth solving" attitude reduced managers' willingness to take action, ultimately hindering success. Thus, our research finds that increasing senior managers' involvement with FLPI will not translate into improvement unless they are inclined to take action on identified issues.
Implications for Theory on Problem Solving
Prior research has found an association between manager involvement and implementation success for FLPI programs such as 6-sigma (Coronado and Antony, 2002) , Scanlon plans (Miles, 1965 , White, 1979 , lean (Worley and Doolen, 2006) , and TQM . However, these studies were typically case studies of a few firms' successful implementations or a survey used to correlate implementation success measures with managers' self-reported involvement with PI. Although these studies establish a relationship between senior management involvement and implementation success, they provide limited insight into how to foster manager involvement or why it is associated with success.
In our study, we manipulated manager involvement by requiring senior managers to engage in FLPI by visiting their frontlines to identify and resolve problems. The FLPI literature suggests that seeing problems in context provides useful information (von Hippel, 1994 ) that might motivate managers to take action to resolve problems. We find that managerial involvement was productive for some, but not all organizations. A possible explanation for our mixed results comes from Miles (1965) . He postulated that managers held one of two beliefs about why employee participation was valuable. One belief was that employee participation was valuable because interacting with senior managers increased the morale of frontline staff, but that the actual ideas they generated were unhelpful. The second belief, which was associated with better performance, was that employee participation was valuable because the ideas raised by frontline employees were useful. Our qualitative data similarly suggested that managers' beliefs moderated the impact of their involvement. Less effective managers seemed to believe that their presence on the frontlines appeased staff, but produced little meaningful information for improvement purposes.
More effective managers seemed to believe that their interactions with frontline staff yielded valuable improvement information, and they took action on it. Thus, our study suggests that managers' beliefs about the validity of frontline employees' concerns is an important moderator variable for manager involvement with FLPI. This implies that rather than designing interventions to increase manager involvement, it may be critical to first design interventions that surface and modify managers' beliefs.
Another contribution of our paper is providing evidence that, at least for the hospitals in our study, improvement ideas raised by frontline staff are roughly of equal importance. Our data suggest that the landscape of problem benefit/cost is relatively flat. In a flat landscape, local search is beneficial and expanded search efforts are an unnecessary use of resources (Sommer and Loch, 2004) . The implication is that little is gained from the current focus on increasing reporting of safety incidents (Evans et al., 2007) because the expanded search is unlikely to yield significantly higher benefit/cost problems. Instead, hospitals would be better served by deploying limited resources on solving existing problems and increasing problem-solving capacity. This empirical finding supports mathematical models of PI (Bohn, 2000, Repenning and Sterman, 2002) , which show negative dynamics when organizations identify more problems than they have capacity to solve. It also supports the finding that underlying capabilities explain differences in organizational improvement (Adler et al., 2003) . We leave it to future research to develop theory on the dynamics of building problem-solving capacity. For example, we suspect that solving problems increases problem-solving capacity by spreading skills and knowledge through the organization.
If so, rather than viewing problem-solving capacity as a resource that decreases with use, a better analogy might be a muscle that strengthens with use.
Implications for Practice
Many hospitals' strategy for improving patient safety is to increase employees' willingness to report near misses and errors (Evans, et al., 2007) . The underlying beliefs are that (1) increasing the number of reports enables organizations to conduct trend analysis that will illuminate important problems; and (2) the majority of the identified issues are of relatively low importance and (3) lower importance problems can be ignored at little to no cost to the organization. Our results show instead that there is little benefit to identifying more problems than an organization has the capacity to solve because doing so doesn't translate into discovering a higher impact set of issues, and not responding to employees' suggestions incurs the cost of inadvertently creating cynical employees who are reluctant to participate in future FLPI efforts. Some managers in our study expressed the belief that employees would be satisfied with increased manager visibility on the frontlines of the organization. Our study suggests that employees are not fooled by managers' symbolic participation in PI programs. Hospitals should first increase problem solving capacity, which will enable them to take action on an increased number of reports.
Organizations can increase problem solving capacity through at least three routes. First, organizations can hire additional staff who are already skilled at PI (Bohn, 2000) . Second, existing employees can be trained on PI techniques. This has the added benefit of developing a common approach and language for PI (Repenning and Sterman, 2001) . Third, using a common approach to resolve problems will create additional capacity by spreading the techniques to those who interface with these efforts (Repenning and Sterman, 2001) . To be successful, PI needs to be part of the regular work of the organization (Victor et al., 2000) . It is also important to educate managers and employees to expect the "worse before better" dynamic that occurs when resources get diverted from production to improvement (Repenning and Sterman, 2001) . However, over time performance should improve and capacity increase as employees become more skilled at PI and contribute more meaningful ideas (Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 2001 ).
Conclusions
Understanding the impact of problem solving orientation on performance is important for improving managers' ability to improve outcomes. Managers' beliefs are critical to successful engagement with frontline staff to improve organizational processes. Managers who value employees' recommendations for improvement and take action to resolve the issues have better results than managers who are skeptical of the value of employees' suggestions and wait for big impact problems before taking action.
Appendix. Survey Items for the Perceived Improvement 1. Overall, the level of patient safety at this facility is improving.
2. The quality of services I help provide is currently the best it has ever been.
3. The overall quality of service at this facility is improving.
4. We are getting fewer complaints about our work. Prioritize, but fix as many as they can 2 "Our people came to two forums and were very open. We had good discussion. It is not easy for us to schedule, but we do it about 4 to 6 weeks out." (Risk Manager) 88% 19% 4 9.5 8.0 *Column headings 1 Hospital identification number; 2 Pseudonym for hospital; 3 Percent change in nurse perception of improvement; 4 Number of Beds in the hospital; 5 Qualitative coding of prioritization process; 6 Qualitative coding of strength of implementation of the PI program (1= weak, 2 = moderate, 3 = strong); 7 Illustrative quote of strength of implementation of the PI program; 8 Average percent of problems in a work area identified from safety forums; 9 Average percent of problems in a work area identified from work system visits; 10 Number of work areas that received the PI program activities (and identified >= 5 problems); 11 Average number of problems identified in a work area; 12 Average number of solved problems in a work area
